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Abstract
We provide a novel Bayesian justification of inference to the best explanation
(IBE). More specifically, we present conditions under which explanatory consider-
ations can provide a significant confirmatory boost for hypotheses that provide the
best explanation of the relevant evidence. Furthermore, we show that the proposed
Bayesian model of IBE is able to deal naturally with the best known criticisms of
IBE such as van Fraassen’s ‘bad lot’ argument.
1 Introduction
Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is a form of non-deductive reasoning that, it
has been widely argued, plays a crucial role in both scientific and everyday reasoning
contexts. To illustrate, suppose that you leave a piece of cheese on the kitchen table
in the evening. The next morning, you find that the cheese is gone (except for a few
crumbs), and you see that there is a small hole in the bottom of the wall. The best
explanation for these observations is that a mouse visited the kitchen in the night, and
you subsequently infer the truth of this hypothesis on the basis of its explanatory power
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(the example is due to van Fraassen 1980: 19–20). Similarly, Edmund Halley (1752)
argued that the best explanation of the observed comets of 1531, 1607, and 1682 was
that these observations were all due to a single comet (later named ‘Halley’s comet’) that
made three revolutions in an elliptical orbit around the sun with a period of 75–76 years.
That the one-comet hypothesis best explains the evidence raises our confidence in that
hypothesis.1 The prevalence of IBE in science has led some to suggest that IBE is the
quintessential way of arguing for theories in science (e.g. Lipton (2004); Psillos (1999);
Williamson (2016)).
Despite the apparent omnipresence of IBE in scientific reasoning, there has been no
broad agreement on its normative status, or even on its exact formulation. Consider the
two examples just mentioned: in the cheese example one infers the truth of the hypothesis
from the fact that the hypothesis best explains the evidence (see Harman 1965), whereas
in the comet example the inference results only in an increase in the probability of the
conclusion.2 Regardless of how one formulates IBE, the general idea is the following:
explanatory considerations are truth-conducive; that a hypothesis is the best explanation
is a mark of the truth of that hypothesis. More specifically, all formulations agree that
explanation has a confirmatory role: “explanatory considerations contribute to making
some hypotheses more credible, and others less so” (Douven 2011: 22). The normative
problem then is to show under what conditions (if any) the fact that a hypothesis is the
best explanation makes that hypothesis more likely to be true than if it had not been the
best explanation.
Given the lack of any consensus regarding the conditions under which IBE can be
legitimately employed as a sound form of ampliative inference, it is perhaps unsurprising
that many authors have argued that the inference scheme can never be given a genuine
normative vindication. For example, consider the so called ‘bad lot’ argument (originally
due to van Fraassen 1989). The gist of the argument is the following. The value of any
instance of IBE is constrained by the set of hypotheses under consideration. If the set
does not contain a true hypothesis, then IBE can only ever return a false conclusion. For,
IBE takes as a premise only that some hypothesis provides a better explanation than all
those explanations that have hitherto been considered. IBE does not provide us with
1More examples of IBE can be found in Douven (2011); Glymour (1984); Lipton (2004); Thagard
(1978). For an extensive overview and a critical discussion of examples of IBE see Norton (2016a; 2016b).
2For more on different formulations of IBE see Douven (2011; 2002).
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any guarantee that we are not starting with a bad lot, i.e. a set of false hypotheses that
does not contain the true one. Therefore, IBE can hardly be an inferential scheme for
attaining true beliefs (for responses to the bad lot objection, see e.g. Lipton (2004); Day
and Kincaid (1994); Schupbach (2013); and Bro¨ssel (2015)3).
A second well known objection (also due to van Fraassen 1989: 160–170) is that IBE,
when formulated in probabilistic terms, is incoherent. Imagine a Bayesian agent who
also considers IBE to be a legitimate inference scheme and agrees to add ‘bonus points’
to the posterior probabilities of a hypothesis after conditionalizing on new evidence, on
the basis of how well the hypothesis explains the evidence: the hypothesis which best
explains the evidence receives the bonus points and all other hypotheses receive no bonus
points. Van Fraassen contends that this updating strategy is liable to a dynamic Dutch-
Book, for the simple reason that it departs from standard Bayesian conditionalization
(see e.g. Teller 1973). Therefore, this probabilistic version of IBE violates the demands
of Bayesian rationality.4
Despite these (and many other) fundamental criticisms of the soundness of IBE-style
inferences, a number of authors have nevertheless attempted to provide normative foun-
dations that legitimate the use of IBE in scientific reasoning (see e.g. Harman 1967,
Douven 2002, and Psillos 2002). Here, we will be interested specifically in those defences
of IBE that explicitly attempt to render the inference scheme compatible with Bayesian
approaches to inductive reasoning in science. Perhaps the most influential defence of this
kind is due originally to Lipton (2001, 2004). Lipton argues that IBE and (subjective)
Bayesianism can be made compatible once one allows for the possibility that explanatory
considerations can be used to inform the prior probabilities and likelihoods that play a
role in Bayesian updating. Famously, subjective Bayesianism (in its standard formula-
tion) does not place any definite restrictions on the assignment of prior probabilities.5
Thus, it seems natural to suggest that explanatory considerations can play a significant
role in determining the prior probabilities and likelihoods that are underspecified by stan-
dard subjective Bayesianism. If this is true, then IBE, far from being incompatible with
Bayesian reasoning, actually plays an important role in determining the subjective prob-
3See Dellse´n (2017b) for a view on why some of these responses do not succeed.
4A number of authors (e.g. Okasha 2000 and Lipton 2004) have criticized this argument claiming that
van Fraassen’s representation of a probabilistic version of IBE—imagining a Bayesian agent who adds
extra bonus points to the best explanatory hypothesis after conditionalization—is idiosyncratic.
5This fact is commonly referred to as the ‘problem of the priors’.
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ability distributions that underlie the Bayesian formalism. This implies that IBE inherits
its normative justification from the role it plays in Bayesian inference.6 However, this way
of justifying IBE would render IBE only an auxiliary device and not an autonomous mode
of inference, since it is Bayesianism that provides us with normatively correct answers
(see Farmakis & Hartmann 2005). Indeed, the sense in which explanatory considerations
can be used to inform prior probabilities and likelihoods has never been systematically
explicated, and it has been argued that the proposal is too vague to count as a genuine
justification of IBE (see Weisberg 2009).7
Overall then, the current situation is clearly unsatisfactory. On the one hand, IBE
is arguably one of the most important methods for arguing in science and, on the other
hand, no extant justification of IBE is able to provide us with precise conditions for the
soundness of IBE-style inferences. The goal of this paper is to specify such conditions.
More specifically, our aim is to provide a (subjective) Bayesian justification of IBE without
simply stipulating that explanatory considerations inform the priors and the likelihoods.
We attempt to show, contra van Fraassen, that explanatory considerations directly affect
the confirmation that hypotheses receive from novel inductive evidence, and that they do
so in a way that is perfectly compatible with Bayesian conditionalization.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section we motivate and present a novel
Bayesian model of IBE, arguing that this model allows us to treat explanatory considera-
tions as evidentially significant without departing from the standard Bayesian framework
(Section 2). We then go on to discuss some prominent criticisms of IBE and address them
in light of our model (Section 3). Lastly, we present conclusions (Section 4). Throughout
the article, we work in the framework of Bayesian epistemology.8
6This way of justifying IBE can also be attributed to a number of authors who argue for the compat-
ibility of IBE and Bayesianism: see Okasha (2000) and Henderson (2015) for instance. Weisberg (2009)
also argues for the compatibility claim between IBE and objective Bayesianism and, at least implicitly,
the reliability of IBE. For a criticism of Weisberg’s proposal see Cabrera (2017).
7For further criticisms of the idea that IBE and Bayesianism can be rendered compatible by allowing
explanatory considerations to ‘inform’ the priors and likelihoods, see Henderson (2015).
8For surveys on Bayesianism see Ha´yek & Hartmann (2010) and Hartmann & Sprenger (2011). For a
critical discussion of Bayesianism see Earman (1992). Applications of Bayesian epistemology to scientific
reasoning can be found in Bovens & Hartmann (2003). Throughout the article, we follow the convention
that propositional variables are denoted by italicized letters (A) and the values of these variables are
denoted by non-italicized letters (A or ¬A).
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2 A Bayesian Model of IBE
2.1 IBE and Novel Evidence
In standard formulations of IBE, it is commonly assumed that the evidence to be ex-
plained is old evidence. We know that the evidence obtains and we try to explain it. The
hypothesis that offers the best explanation is subsequently confirmed. Thus, in the cheese
example, the evidence leads us to formulate the hypothesis that a mouse ate the cheese,
and the fact that this offers the best available explanation of the evidence leads us to
regard the hypothesis as (probably) true. On closer inspection, however, one finds that
in the literature on IBE it is new evidence that typically provides confirmation. There
are two ways to understand this. First, van Fraassen (1989) and Douven (2013) take IBE
to operate on a pre-existing set of hypotheses: IBE selects the best among existing ex-
planations that have already been formulated irrespective of evidence. For instance, both
van Fraassen and Douven consider a set of hypotheses where each hypothesis expresses
a different coin bias before the coin was tossed, and it is only after a coin was tossed
that they ask which of the hypotheses best explains the evidence (which in this case is a
sequence of heads and tails). Thus, IBE only takes effect once new evidence is obtained.
Another way of understanding the role of novel evidence in IBE is to say that although
hypotheses are often formulated in order to explain an existing body of old evidence, the
actual confirmation of those hypotheses only happens later, once new evidence is obtained.
Thus, we read:
Although a hypothesis might be reasonably accepted as the most plausible
hypothesis based on explanatory considerations (abduction), the degree of
confidence in this hypothesis is tied to its subsequent confirmation. (Psillos
2000: 67, original emphasis)
Indeed, it would seem rather circular to say that, following our example, we first form
the hypotheses in order to explain the existing evidence, and then use the very same
evidence to confirm them. Sentiments of this type have also been forwarded by e.g. Norton
(2016a; 2016b), who argues that (new) evidential import always plays a significant role
in prospective examples of IBE. Lipton (2004: 113) argues that both ‘loveliness’ (i.e. how
explanatory a hypothesis is relative to evidence) and Bayesian likelihoods are relative
to new evidence. Henderson (2015: 696) points out that unification (often cited as a
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paradigmatic explanatory virtue) depends on both old and new evidence, and that “[w]e
assess the best explanation with respect to all the data, past and present.” Okasha (2000:
703) argues that explanatory considerations figure simultaneously with confirmation, once
new evidence is obtained. To illustrate, consider the following example (due to Okasha
2000: 702–203). A mother takes her child, who is obviously in pain, to see a doctor. Based
on the mother’s description, the doctor forms two hypotheses concerning what’s wrong
with the child, H1 and H2. The doctor then further examines the child, observes some
new symptoms, and decides that H2 is a better explanation of the observed symptoms
than H1. The doctor concludes that H2 is a more plausible hypothesis. So, the doctor first
formulated the two hypotheses based on the mother’s description (old evidence). But it
is only after the doctor has further examined the child (i.e. after the new evidence came
in) that she decides that the hypothesis H2 is the better explanation of the symptoms
and rejects H1 as implausible.
Another example that illustrates how new evidence plays a role in IBE is the case of
Halley’s comet. Halley (1752: Oooo3) recounts: “. . . I suspected, from the like situation
of their Planes and Perihelion, that the Comets which appeared in the years 1531, 1607,
and 1682, were one and the same Comet that had made three Revolutions in its Elliptic
Orbit.” After establishing the orbit of the hypothesized comet more precisely, Halley
went on to show that the observational consequences of his hypothesis cohered well with
the existing data:
You see therefore an agreement of all the Elements in these three, which
would be next to a miracle if they were three different Comets; or if it was
not the approach of the same Comet towards the Sun and Earth, in three
different revolutions in an Ellipsis around them. Wherefore if according to
what we have already said it should return again about the year 1758, candid
posterity will not refuse to acknowledge that this was first discovered by an
Englishman. (Halley 1752: Ssss, original emphasis)
Halley’s reasoning seems very much in line with IBE. He formulated a hypothesis that
nicely explained the existing evidence, and argued that other explanations postulating
more than one comet seemed unlikely, though they might have fit the evidence equally
well. However, it was not until the next observation of the comet that Halley’s hypothesis
was actually confirmed (see also Laplace 1995/1825: 3 and Salmon 2001: 123–124). So it
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is not the old evidence (i.e. the evidence that the hypothesis was formulated to explain)
that confers confirmation to the hypothesis; rather, the hypothesis is confirmed by the
future, yet unobserved evidence. Although the fact that a hypothesis offers the best
available explanation of the evidence it was designed to explain may well be good reason
for us to entertain it as a serious possibility, it seems strange to claim that this kind
of reasoning leads to genuine confirmation of the hypothesis. Thus, we follow Norton
and others in claiming that in prospective examples of IBE, the actual confirmation only
ever takes place after some novel evidence has been obtained. But unlike Norton and
other critics of IBE, we contend that explanatory considerations can make a significant
difference to the confirmatory import of that novel evidence.
Thus, the conception of IBE considered here can be found in the writings of both
advocates and critics of IBE. Van Fraassen (1989) criticised this conception IBE as being
liable to a dynamic Dutch book. Specifically, he argued that any attempt to include
explanatory considerations in one’s evidential updating rule will lead to a necessary de-
viation from Bayesian conditionalization, and will thereby render one susceptible to a
dynamic Dutch book. However, Douven (2013), one of the advocates of IBE, showed
that there exist many scenarios in which augmenting standard Bayesian conditionaliza-
tion by awarding ‘bonus points’ to hypotheses that provide the best explanation of the
novel evidence will lead to a genuine increase in performance (as measured by proper
scoring rules). So, there are situations in which agents who update in accordance with
IBE will consistently outperform their Bayesian counterparts. Furthermore, Douven and
Schupbach (2015) report experiments which appear to demonstrate that explanatory con-
siderations play a crucial role in the way that people actually go about updating their
beliefs in everyday reasoning contexts. In what follows, we attempt to show that (i) it is
possible for the Bayesian to take the confirmatory significance of explanatory consider-
ations into account without surrendering or amending standard conditionalization, and
(ii) it is possible for the advocate of IBE style inferences to avoid dynamic Dutch books.
2.2 The Model
This brings us to our Bayesian model of IBE. As mentioned above, we want to show that
the fact that a hypothesis is the best explanation confers confirmatory support to the
hypothesis in addition to the confirmatory support conferred by (new) evidence. We begin
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by making some important conceptual clarifications and outlining some fundamental
assumptions of our model.
First, note that the property of ‘being a good (best) explanation’ is not an intrinsic
property of hypotheses. In particular, whether or not a hypothesis H counts as a good
explanation is always determined relative to a particular body of evidence. H can exhibit
a wealth of explanatory virtues when considered in the light of one body of evidence, but
be found severely lacking in alternative evidential contexts. A nice way of seeing this is
to consider, for example, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which evaluates a
hypothesis based on both its fit to a fixed body of evidence and its internal complexity.
If H accounts well for the evidence without sacrificing too much in the way of simplicity,
it will have a good (low) BIC score, and will be considered a good explanation of the
relevant evidence. In what follows, we assume that the property of ‘being a good (best)
explanation’ is always a binary one that applies not to individual hypotheses, but rather
to hypothesis-evidence pairs.
Secondly, we contend that explanatory considerations can only ever have confirma-
tional import in situations where the evidence being explained is known to obtain. Clearly,
the fact that H provides the best explanation of E should not be taken as indicative of
H’s truth in situations where we think that E is likely to be false. We might think that
Creationism would provide an excellent explanation of the fossil record if it were the case
that there were no fossils older than 10,000 years. However, since this is not the evidential
situation we find ourselves in, it would be extremely strange to use this observation as an
argument for the truth of Creationism. Thus, we assume that the fact that H provides
the best explanation of E can only ever be confirmationally relevant to the truth of H
in cases where we know that E obtains. So if we fix a potential piece of evidence E and
a hypothesis H and let X be the proposition ‘H is the best available explanation of E’,
we require that H and X should be probabilistically independent when we do not know
whether or not E in fact obtains, since otherwise H and X would be probabilistically
dependent on each other even if the evidence E does not obtain, which leads to strange
consequences as shown in the example above. However, we allow for the possibility that
X and H can be probabilistically dependent, once we know whether the evidence E ob-
tains. To illustrate, imagine that H is a hypothesis that would provide the best available
explanation of E, were E to obtain. We do not yet take this to count in H’s favour, since
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E might never be observed. However, if we subsequently go on to perform an experiment
that produces the evidence E, the fact that H provides the best available explanation of
E may well be taken as a sign of its truth. To summarise then, we have at least three
propositional variables H, E, and X with corresponding values:
H: The hypothesis is true.
¬H: The hypothesis is false.
E: The evidence obtains.
¬E: The evidence does not obtain.
X: Of all the currently available hypotheses, H would be the best explanation of E,
were E to obtain.
¬X: Of all the currently available hypotheses, H would not be the best explanation of
E, were E to obtain.
We have argued that H and X should be probabilistically independent in the absence
of knowledge about the value of E, i.e. (i) H ⊥ X. We have also argued that H and X
may be probabilistically dependent conditional on a known value of E, i.e. we want to
allow for the possibility that (ii) ¬(H ⊥ X | E). Together, these conditions are sufficient
to pick out the following Bayesian network representation (Figure 1) of the probabilistic
relationships between H,E and X.
E
H X
Figure 1: The Bayesian Network representation of IBE
Our basic aim in this paper is to show that explanatory considerations can make a
difference to the confirmatory import of novel evidence. In this context, this amounts to
proving the following inequality,
P (H | E,X) > P (H | E) (1)
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If (1) holds, then upon learning the novel evidence E, the fact that H is the best
available explanation of E will add to the confirmation that E confers upon H in the
absence of explanatory considerations. Before proving Eq. (1) we need to specify the
basic parameters of the network.
P (H) = h , P (X) = x
P (E | H,X) = α , P (E | H,¬X) = β (2)
P (E | ¬H,X) = γ , P (E | ¬H,¬X) = δ
At this stage, we need to motivate one further constraint on the parameters of the
network. This constraint is motivated by the idea that we should expect to observe
evidence that is well explained by the true hypothesis. To illustrate, imagine that we are
interested in describing house prices as a function of average income in the area of the
property. Suppose further that we are certain that, in the long run, house prices are
correctly described by one and only one of the three curves H1, H2 and H3 (see Figure 2).
Next, suppose that we are awaiting some relevant survey data regarding the relationship
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Figure 2: Three curves describing house prices as a function of average income
between house prices and averag income. In particular, we are considering how likely
it is that the survey produces the body of data, E (see Figure 3). Finally, suppose that
another, more talented research team then inform us of (a) the results of a comprehensive
study they conducted on the relationship between house prices and average income, and
(b) the respective BIC scores of the curves H1, H2 and H3 with respect to E. There
are a number of possibilities. First, they could tell us that (i) it turns out that H1 is
actually the ‘true curve’ that accurately describes the relationship between house prices
and average income, and (ii) H1 has the best BIC score for E. Alternatively, they might
tell us that (i) H1 is the ‘true curve’ that accurately describes the relationship between
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Figure 3: Data regarding house prices and average income
house prices and average income, and (ii’) H2 has the best BIC score for E. It seems clear
that we should view E as a more likely outcome in the case where we learn (ii) than we
should in the case where we learn (ii’). For, in the case where we learn (ii), we are told
that E is best explained (equating explanatory virtue with a good BIC score) by what
we know to be the true hypothesis, whereas in the case where we learn (ii’) we are told
that E is better accounted for by what we know to be a false hypothesis. Since we should
expect to observe evidence that is well accounted for by what we know to be the true
hypothesis, we should believe E to a higher degree in the former case than we do in the
later case. This intuition is exactly what is captured by the following basic constraint on
the parameters of the network:9
α ≥ β , δ > γ (3)
To reiterate, the inequalities in (3) simply state that we should view E as more likely
to be true when it is best explained by what we know to be the true hypothesis compared
to when it is best explained by what we know to be a false hypothesis. Overall, our model
is characterised by the following basic constraints:
A1: The variable H is (unconditionally) independent of X:
H ⊥ X (4)
A2: The relation among the conditional probabilities is as follows:
α ≥ β , δ > γ (5)
9Note that the reasoning here can equally be taken to motivate the strict inequality α > β, but it
turns out that we only need the weaker condition α ≥ β.
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Together, A1 and A2 are jointly sufficient to guarantee the following result (all proofs
in Appendix):
Theorem 1 If A1 and A2 hold, then X adds to E’s confirmation of H, i.e. P (H | E,X) >
P (H | E).
And this is exactly what we wanted to show. Theorem 1 tells us that H’s being
the best explanation of the novel evidence E adds an additional confirmational ‘boost’
that would be absent if we neglected explanatory considerations. Furthermore, the con-
firmatory import of explanatory virtue has been explicated within a purely Bayesian
framework. It is still assumed that agents update by standard Bayesian conditionaliza-
tion. Thus, Theorem 1 allows us to respect the Bayesian’s commitment to updating by
conditionalization whilst also taking into account (i) the fact, demonstrated by Douven
and Schupbach (2015), that explanatory considerations seem to play a crucial role in the
way that people update their beliefs in everyday reasoning contexts, and (ii) Douven’s
(2013) observation that there are situations where ideal agents who take explanatory
considerations into account will do better than their Bayesian counterparts. We inter-
pret Theorem 1 as providing a demonstration that it is possible to take into account the
significant confirmatory import of explanatory considerations without surrendering any
fundamental features of the Bayesian framework.
2.3 Generalising the Model
Until now, we have dealt with only one hypothesis (H). We now extend our model to
include n hypotheses. We aim at showing that P (Hi | E,Xi) > P (Hi | E) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.10
Apart from assumption A1 from above (generalised in the obvious way), a different but
related assumption to A2 is needed to prove this inequality.
Let αij := P (E | Hi,Xj), hi := P (Hi), and xi := P (Xi), where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
A2’: There is a least one pair (k, r) with k ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i} and r ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}
where αii ≥ αir and αkr > αki. For all other pairs (l,m) with l ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i, k}
and m ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i, r} it holds that αii αlm ≥ αim αli.
10Where Xi is the proposition ‘Of all the currently available hypotheses, Hi would be the best expla-
nation of E, were E to obtain’.
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Notice that A2’ collapses into A2 when we have one hypothesis (i.e. H): αii ≥ αir and
αkr > αki become α ≥ β and δ > γ. The motivation for A2’ is directly analogous to
the motivation for A2 described above, i.e. that we should expect evidence which is well
explained by the true hypothesis.
Using assumptions A1 and A2’ one can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2 If A1 and A2’ hold, then Xi adds to E’s confirmation of Hi, that is
P (Hi | E,Xi) > P (Hi | E).
Theorem 2 generalizes Theorem 1 and it says that in cases of n explanations, Xi provides
additional confirmation to Hi if A1 and A2’ hold.
2.4 What We Haven’t Done
At this stage, it is important to clarify exactly what we take the philosophical import of
Theorem 1 (and Theorem 2) to be. At the fundamental level, the novel insight here is that
it is possible to think of explanatory considerations as providing a confirmatory ‘boost’, as
described by Douven (2013), without abandoning conditionalization and thereby becom-
ing liable to a dynamic Dutch book. This allows the Bayesian to account for the empirical
fact that people appear to rely on explanatory considerations when updating on novel
evidence, and it also means that the Bayesian can respond to Douven’s observation that
there are situations where agents who reason in accordance with IBE outperform their
Bayesian counterparts. For, according to the model described above, the difference be-
tween the two update strategies described by Douven (2013) is not a difference between
a Bayesian agent on the one hand and a non-Bayesian agent on the other. Rather, it
is a difference between a Bayesian who fails to take into account relevant explanatory
considerations and another (possibly non-Bayesian) who does take those considerations
into account. The problem is not with conditionalization as an update rule, but rather
with the fact that the Bayesian agent is ignoring the explanatory virtues of the relevant
hypotheses.
It is important to note that we do not take ourselves to have contributed to the
debate concerning the nature of the explanatory virtues. In particular, we have said
nothing about what makes a hypothesis a good explanation of some given evidence. In the
justification of our model, we equated explanatory virtue with the Bayesian information
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score because, whatever one thinks about the nature of explanatory virtue, it is natural
to think that curves with lower information scores count as better explanations of the
relevant evidence. We intend to remain ecumenical about the nature of explanatory
virtue, and merely take ourselves to be providing conditions under which explanatory
considerations can contribute to confirmation.
3 Explanation, Confirmation, and Bad Lots
In this section, we turn to addressing the relationship between the model described here
and some well known criticisms of IBE from the literature. We start with van Fraassen’s
‘bad lot’ objection.
3.1 Bad Lots and Bad Explanations
An implicit assumption of our model is that the hypotheses being considered are mutually
exclusive and, more importantly, jointly exhaustive, i.e. their probabilities always sum to
1. As we mentioned in the introduction, this is a strong assumption that is not always
justified. There is no guarantee that we are not starting with a bad lot. This problem can
be resolved by assuming that one of the hypotheses being considered is a ‘catch-all’, i.e.
the negation of the disjunction of all the other hypotheses (see Niiniluoto 1999: S447–
S448). Thus, the variable H will have n+ 1 values, the first n of which correspond to the
hypotheses under consideration. The n + 1’th value, denoted ‘HC ’, corresponds to the
proposition:
HC : All of the considered hypotheses are false.
It is clear that this guarantees that the probability of the values of H will sum to
1. However, a new problem arises at this point. Specifically, if we let HC denote the
catch-all proposition, we need to provide a suitable interpretation of the corresponding
value XC of X. We cannot simply interpret XC as the proposition ‘HC would provide the
best available explanation of E’, since this proposition will generally have zero probability.
Catch-all hypotheses are paradigms of explanatory vice. The negation of some finite set of
scientific hypotheses is generally going to fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of any
non-trivial evidence. Also, note that XC always having zero probability is incompatible
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with the basic assumptions of our model, since we want to allow for the situation where
conditioning on XC raises the probability of HC when we have already conditioned on E.
To solve this problem, we follow Lipton (2004: 59) (the two-filter process) and Mus-
grave (1988: 238–239) (the minimal adequacy condition) in arguing that IBE can only
be applied in situations where, as well as knowing that the relevant hypothesis provides
the best explanation of the evidence E, we also know that the hypothesis provides a good
enough explanation of E. This requires that for each hypothesis Hi 6= HC , we interpret
the value Xi of X as the proposition:
Xi: Of all the currently available hypotheses, Hi would be the best explanation of E,
were E to obtain, and Hi provides a sufficiently good explanation of E
Under this interpretation, we can then think of XC as the proposition:
XC : None of the currently available hypotheses provide a sufficiently good explanation
of E.
It is easy to see that this slight shift in the interpretation of the variables does not
interfere with the original philosophical motivations for the constraints on our model.
However, another issue does arise here. Specifically, we now need to specify what counts
as a ‘sufficiently good explanation’. We leave the provision of a detailed answer to this
problem for another day, and restrict ourselves to the following observation. Of course,
the notion of a ‘sufficiently good’ explanation is fundamentally a vague one, and it seems
unlikely that one can provide a principled specification of the threshold of explanatory
virtue above which an explanation counts as ‘sufficiently good’. However, the mere fact
that the notion is a vague one does not mean that it cannot be the subject of probabilistic
partial beliefs. One may not be sure whether or not string theory gives a good explanation
of the isotropy of the cosmic microwave background, but one may be more confident that
it does so than one is that non-relativistic quantum mechanics does. Similarly, one may
be more confident that the person one sees in the distance is tall than one is that their
T-shirt is red, even though both of the relevant concepts are inherently vague.
Once one reinterprets the values of the variables in the way described above, the bad
lot objection ceases to be a problem. We now have a justification for the assumption
that the hypothesis space is exhaustive. Moreover, we also obtain the following desirable
result: learning that none of the hypotheses being considered provide a sufficiently good
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explanation of the evidence E gives a confirmatory boost to the catch-all hypothesis
HC with respect to E. Thus, our model can capture the intuition that IBE plays an
important role not just in the context of justification, but also in the context of discovery,
as pointed out by Lipton (2004: 67) and Okasha (2000: 706–707). If HC receives a
confirmatory boost, then none of the hypotheses under consideration is sufficiently good,
hence the best explanation of the evidence E lies outside of the space of considered
hypotheses and one should look for a new, not yet considered, explanation of the evidence
E. Thus, our Bayesian model of IBE not only provides a novel justification of IBE, it also
captures the fact that an agent using IBE can respond to the new evidence by inventing
a new hypothesis. This allows us to respond to Okasha (2000: 707), who argues that
Bayesianism is silent when it comes to the context of discovery.
3.2 Explanatoriness is not Confirmatory
Roche and Sober (2013) argue that explanatory considerations are incapable of adding
to the confirmatory support of novel evidence. More specifically they argue that
P (H | E,X′) = P (H | E), where H and E are as in our model and X′ expresses a counter-
factual: if H and E were true, then H would explain E. Roche and Sober argue for that
claim by considering the following example. Let H be the hypothesis that S smokes at
least 10,000 cigarettes before age 50, and let E be the evidence that S gets lung cancer
after age 50. X′ then says that if S smoked 10,000 cigarettes before age 50 and S got
lung cancer after age 50, then the smoking would explain the lung cancer. Observing a
large sample of people that developed lung cancer after age 50 and counting how many of
these individuals smoked at least 10,000 cigarettes before age 50, scientists can estimate
P (H | E) and find it to be c. Roche and Sober then claim that conditioning additionally
on X′ clearly does not change that estimate c, which is determined purely by the observed
frequencies. Therefore, P (H | E,X′) = P (H | E).
However, this example is a very special case, where the likelihood P (H | E) is deter-
mined by clear and well defined frequencies. Generally, subjective Bayesian probabilities
are not straightforwardly given by approximations to long run frequencies. Although we
agree that explanatory considerations may be inert in the special cases where degrees of
belief are fixed by observed frequencies, this does not speak against the applicability of
our analysis in the much more general case where subjective degrees are not fixed by an
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objective standard of this type. A similar response is developed in much more detail by
Lange (2017).
3.3 Multiple Plausible Rivals
Dellse´n (2017a) argues that IBE ignores the fact that an inference to a hypothesis H may
be undermined by the availability of competing explanatory hypotheses. To illustrate,
suppose that at time t1 there were five hypothesis in our hypothesis space. Three of
these are then refuted by new observations, so that at a later time t2 there are only two
remaining hypotheses under consideration. Intuitively, the two remaining hypotheses are
more plausible at t2 than they were at t1, since they have less competitors. However,
how well each hypothesis explains the evidence remains invariant between t1 and t2, and
Dellse´n argues that IBE is unable to incorporate this intuitive insight, since it admonishes
us to infer the truth of hypotheses based on their explanatory virtues, which remain
constant between t1 and t2.
Our model of IBE naturally bypasses criticisms of this type. For, on our approach,
one does not simply infer the truth (or probable truth) of the hypothesis purely because
it has the most explanatory virtue. Rather, explanatory virtues contribute to the extent
to which hypotheses are confirmed by novel evidence. In the previous example, the
probability of the two remaining hypotheses will generally increase between t1 and t2
in our model, regardless of the fact that their explanatory ‘loveliness’ remain constant.
However, the extent to which the hypotheses explain novel evidence will still contribute
to the degree to which they are confirmed by that evidence. There is no tension here, and
the problem arises from an overly simplistic understanding of the role of IBE in scientific
inference.
4 Conclusion
Overall then, we have presented a novel Bayesian justification of IBE style inferences.
Specifically, we have argued that explanatory considerations can add to the confirmatory
power of novel evidence in a way that is perfectly compatible with Bayesian condition-
alization. This approach has a number of significant virtues. Firstly, it allows us to
resolve a number of famous criticisms of explanatory reasoning including, for example,
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van Fraassen’s dynamic Dutch book and bad lot arguments. Secondly, it also accounts
for the important role that IBE plays in the context of discovery, which many consid-
ered to be an advantage of IBE that Bayesianism cannot account for. The Bayesian
model employed here can be thought of as ‘probabilifying’ explanatory considerations
and providing a precise mechanism that explicates the role that (best) explanation plays
in Bayesian updating. We conclude that explanatory considerations do indeed play a sig-
nificant part in scientific reasoning, but they do so in a way that is perfectly compatible
with standard Bayesian epistemology.
A Proofs
A.1 Theorem 1
We want to show that P (H | E,X) > P (H | E), i.e. P (H | E,X)−P (H | E) > 0. Applying
the theory of Bayesian networks to Figure 1 and using assumption A1 (H ⊥ X), we
calculate:
P (H | E,X) = P (H,E,X)
P (E,X)
=
P (H)P (X)P (E | H,X)
P (X)
∑
H
P (H)P (E | H,X)
=
hxα
x (hα + h γ)
=
hα
hα + h γ
P (H | E) = P (H,E)
P (E)
=
P (H)
∑
X P (X)P (E | H, X)∑
H,X P (H)P (X)P (E | H,X)
=
h (xα + x β)
h (xα + x β) + h (x γ + x δ)
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Hence,
P (H | E,X)− P (H | E) = hα
hα + h γ
− h (xα + x β)
h (xα + x β) + h (x γ + x δ)
=
hα
[
h (xα + x β) + h (x γ + xδ)
]− h (xα + x β) (hα + hγ)
(hα + h γ)
[
h (xα + x β) + h (x γ + x δ)
]
= h
hα (x γ + x δ) + (xα + x β) (hα− hα− h γ)
(hα + h γ)
[
h (xα + x β) + h (x γ + x δ)
]
= hh
xα γ + xα δ − xα γ − x β γ
(hα + h γ)
[
h (xα + x β) + h (x γ + x δ)
]
= xhh
α δ − β γ
(hα + h γ)
[
h (xα + x β) + h (x γ + x δ)
] .
Assumption A2 (α ≥ β and δ > γ) entails that α δ−β γ is strictly positive. Therefore,
P (H | E,X)− P (H | E) is strictly positive.
A.2 Theorem 2
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, we use assumption A1 and additionally allow
that there are n hypotheses. We define αij := P (E | Hi,Xj).
P (Hi | E,Xi) = P (Hi,E,Xi)
P (E,Xi)
=
xi hi αii
xi
∑
j
hj αji
=
hi αii∑
j
hj αji
P (Hi | E) =
∑
j
P (Hi | E,Xj)P (Xj | E)
=
hi αii∑
j
hj αji
P (Xi,E)
P (E)
+
∑
k 6=i
hi αik∑
j
hj αjk
P (Xk,E)
P (E)

=
hi αii
P (Xi,E)
xi
P (Xi,E)
P (E)
+
hi
P (E)
(∑
k 6=i
αik
P (Xk,E)
P (Xk,E)
xk
)
=
hi
P (E)
(
xi αii +
∑
k 6=i
xk αik
)
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=
hi∑
p,q
hp xq αpq
(∑
j
xj αij
)
Let K := P (Hi | E,Xi)− P (Hi | E). We then calculate:
K =
hi αii∑
j
hj αji
− hi∑
p,q
hp xq αpq
(∑
j
xj αij
)
= hi
[
αii
(∑
p,q
hp xq αpq
)
−
(∑
j
xj αij
) (∑
j
hj αji
)]
·G−1
= hi
[
hi αii
(∑
j
xj αij
)
+ αii
(∑
k 6=i,j
hk xjαkj
)
−
(∑
j
xj αij
) (∑
j
hj αji
)]
·G−1
= hi
[(∑
j
xj αij
)(
hi αii − hi αii −
(∑
k 6=i
hk αki
))
+ αii
(∑
k 6=i,j
hk xjαkj
)]
·G−1
= hi
[
αii
(∑
k 6=i,j
hk xjαkj
)
−
(∑
j
xj αij
)(∑
k 6=i
hk αki
)]
·G−1
= hi
[
αii xi
(∑
k 6=i
hk αki
)
+ αii
( ∑
k 6=i,r 6=i
hk xr αkr
)
− αii xi
(∑
k 6=i
hk αki
)
−
(∑
k 6=i
xk αik
)(∑
k 6=i
hk αki
)]
·G−1
= hi
[
αii
( ∑
k 6=i,r 6=i
hk xr αkr
)
−
(∑
k 6=i
xk αik
)(∑
k 6=i
hk αki
)]
·G−1
= hi
( ∑
k 6=i,r 6=i
hk xr αii αkr −
∑
k 6=i,r 6=i
hk xr αirαki
)
·G−1
= hi
( ∑
k 6=i,r 6=i
hk xr (αii αkr − αir αki)
)
·G−1,
where G :=
(∑
j
hj αji
)(∑
p,q
hp xq αpq
)
.
Assumption A2’ entails that the difference αii αkr − αir αki is non-negative and that
it is strictly positive for at least one pair (k, r). Therefore, K is strictly positive.
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